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The idea of an international ‘target’ for aid to
underdeveloped countries in terms of the available
resources of the richer or donor countries originally
formed part of the proposals for the First United
Nations Development Decade of the 1960s. This in
turn had its origin in the group of economic advisers
to President Kennedy when he assumed office early
in 1961, although the idea has historical roots further
back into the 1950s. It had a counterpart in a similar
‘target’ of a 5 per cent growth rate for the national
income of the underdeveloped or recipient countries
themselves.
Neither of these targets was very clearly defined,
nor was there any specific consistency model
developed at the time to link these two targets.
Both targets initially had little more than
declamatory value; neither represented any binding
or legal commitment. (Indeed in the case of the
5 per cent growth target it was difficult to see how
a legal commitment could possibly have been
entered into.) The unanimous acceptance of the 1 per
cent target by the donor countries did not,
therefore, amount to more than a statement of
good intention to follow policies – presumably more
direct policies in the case of public aid than in that of
private investment – which would move total ‘aid’ (as
defined for inclusion in the 1 per cent target)
towards this target figure.
In the circumstances, it would have been defensible
to dismiss the whole 1 per cent business as
completely meaningless and hypocritical, an
‘absolutely dead thing’. It is possible that some donor
countries at least were quite ready to ‘accept’ the
1 per cent target precisely because it was considered
meaningless and empty. This however has turned out
to be not the case. Once proclaimed, the 1 per cent
target, like Milton’s books, could be said to be ‘not
absolutely dead things’, but to ‘contain a potency of
life’. This became clear almost from the outset when
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the donors’ club, took up this
target. Attempts to put teeth into it by making it
more precise were not slow in developing. Again,
one may speculate that the target might well have
remained a meaningless symbol if an international
organisation representing the donors had not
existed, including a Secretariat with a direct interest
in taking up this 1 per cent target as a point of
departure for discussions and negotiations among
the member countries. Lest this view be considered
too cynical let us hasten to add that there was also,
in the early 1960s, a great deal of goodwill and
support for a genuine 1 per cent target; without this
the OECD might never have been able to give this
target real content.1 Moreover, this view neglects a
vital fact referred to in the concluding paragraph of
this note: the idea of burden-sharing which is a real
factor in the aid situation and which the DAC and its
staff represents. It was more than bureaucratic
interests which led to 1 per cent target + DAC/OECD
= potency of life.
From the beginning it became clear that to have any
‘potency of life’ the 1 per cent target would require
some kind of definition of ‘aid’. It was immediately
obvious that the target as proclaimed was a
complete misnomer. It did not at all relate to aid –
which is presumably a quid without a quo – but to
the total flows of financial resources from rich to
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poor countries, including such things as private
investment, guaranteed export credits, hard loans on
commercial rates of interest, etc. – all items with a
definite quo (some would say that the quo is often
bigger than the quid!). Very soon, therefore, there
chrystallised a distinction between the total flow of
financial resources and the concessional or aid
element within the total flow. This distinction took
two forms. The first was the development of the
concept of the ‘grant element’; this represents the
value of what is being given minus the present
discounted value of any repayment obligation
involved (i.e. the quid minus the quo. Originally
developed by private analysts,2 the concept was
quickly taken up in the DAC/OECD and has in fact
been regularly calculated in its annual Reviews of
Development Assistance. The actual calculation of
the ‘grant element’ is not always easy: the use of the
proper time discount rate, the treatment of grace
periods or waiver clauses in loans, repayments in
local currency, etc are among the items which give
some trouble in calculations of the grant element.
However, the calculations of the grant element
dramatically brought home the point that in terms of
real aid only a minor part of the flow of financial
resources would qualify against the 1 per cent target
(e.g. only 0.35 per cent of gross national product
(GNP) of OECD countries in 1967 out of 0.75 per
cent). 
The second form which the distinction between real
aid and flow of financial resources took, was the
elaboration of a series of subtargets – within the
1 per cent overall target – regarding the terms on
which aid was to be given. Thus, in its 1965 ‘Terms
Recommendation’, the OECD has enjoined upon its
member countries that at least 81 per cent of all
public aid should be given at less than 3 per cent rate
of interest, with a minimum loan duration of 25
years for 82 per cent of all loan commitments, and a
weighted average grace period of 7 per cent or
more. The DAC then calculates comparative ‘terms
performance’ by its member countries.
In fact, these subtargets have become extremely
complicated since various alternative combinations
indicating a certain ‘softness’ of the flow of public
financial resources are optionally given to the
member countries.
While these subtargets define a degree of softness
and hence the presence of real aid, and also have a
rather vague status and cannot be considered more
than a declaration of good intentions, they, too, have
had a considerable effect in softening the terms of
transfers of public capital to poorer countries. One
can perhaps notice a tendency for this influence to
be more marked in countries where there was in the
first place an intention to increase real aid and soften
terms, and perhaps less effect in bringing sinners into
line. In that sense, it is legitimate to question the real
effectiveness of the subtargets.
The original target – 1 per cent of national income of
donor countries – was subsequently raised to 1 per
cent of GNP at market prices. This effectively
amounted to raising the target by about 20 per
cent.3 The question arises: Why not maintain the old
basis of national income and raise the 1 per cent
target to, say, 1.25 per cent? Presumably the answer
is the beautiful simplicity and symbolic value of 1 per
cent. Just possibly it could be argued that the GNP is
conceptually preferable to NNI (net national income)
as a basis for determining aid-giving capacity – since
the GNP measures resources which could either be
channelled back into the replacement, maintenance
and repair of capital used up in production – thus
bringing us back to the lower national income figure
– or else could be used for giving aid to poorer
countries. This, however, is not a particularly
convincing line of reasoning. One must assume that
the replacement of their own domestic capital basis
is considered by donor countries as a prior charge on
total resources, and the relative priorities of foreign
aid in relation to other claims are only considered in
respect of resources left over after replacing capital,
i.e. in relation to national income. To this extent, one
feels that it would have been more direct and honest
to keep the national income basis and raise the
target percentage instead. The raising of the target
at the second UNCTAD meeting (two-thirds of the
way through the development decade) can perhaps
best be considered as a recognition of the fact that
under the old accounting system of 1 per cent of
national income many more items had come to be
included as within the 1 per cent target than had
been dreamed of by President Kennedy and his
economist advisers (who had been thinking of real
aid). Of course, if this was the motive, the change-
over from 1 per cent of national income to 1 per cent
of GNP was a very indirect and rough-and-ready
way of dealing with this, as compared with the
approach through the grant element or through
subtargets relating to softness of aid.
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The culmination of this effort to disentangle real aid
from the flow of financial resources is the recent
recommendation of the Pearson Commission to
establish as a subtarget within the 1 per cent overall
target of 0.7 per cent of GNP in the flow of public
(government) aid. This can of course be justified on
two grounds: (a) it is only in connection with public
capital transfers that the question of aid in the sense
of a quid without a quo really arises; and (b) that it is
only public aid which is more directly within the
power and control of governments to determine. It
is perhaps interesting to speculate that 0.7 per cent
of GNP – the new Pearson subtarget – is not too
different from 1 per cent of national income. Thus
we are back to the old Kennedy idea that 1 per cent
of national income should be given in real aid. On
top of this we now have the implicit additional
Pearson target of 0.3 per cent of GNP in terms of
private investment, export credits, etc. This must
remain largely non-operational since the flow of
private investment is not really in the power of
governments except very indirectly. (The Pearson
Commission points out that this is only a minimum
target but this does not quite dispose of the doubt.)
In the specific case of the UK, the Pearson minimum
subtarget of 0.3 per cent of GNP in the form of
private investment and guaranteed export credits has
been reached in the latest available year (1968).
However, the other subtarget of 0.7 per cent in
public aid has been considerably under-fulfilled, and
expansion of public aid by almost three-quarters
would be needed to reach it. If we assume that the
cost of private investment and export credits to the
recipient countries is at the rate of 10 per cent per
annum while public aid costs them say 2 per cent per
annum, the present mixture of British resources for
underdeveloped countries which is practically 1:1 as
between public and private flows would cost the
recipient countries 6 per cent per annum, whereas
the Pearson mixture of 3:7 would cost them 4.4 per
cent per annum – a difference of over a quarter.
It is obvious that a target without a firm date
attached to it at which it is to be reached is
essentially meaningless, even as a statement of good
intentions. The Pearson Commission has
recommended that the new operational target of
0.7 per cent of GNP for public aid should be reached
‘by 1975 or shortly thereafter, but in no case later
than 1980’.4 Even this range and formulation leaves a
good deal of uncertainty. It may be noted that the
increase in public aid required from the UK, on the
assumption that the target is reached by everybody
in 1975, would be substantially less than for the
average OECD member. This is the result of two
factors: (a) the British share of public net aid in GNP
is already slightly above the OECD average (0.42 per
cent as against 0.39 per cent), so that the UK has a
shorter way to go to reach 0.7 per cent; and (b) the
assumed growth rate of the UK GNP between now
and 1975 is less than for the OECD average. As a
combined result of these two factors, the increase in
public aid required of the UK between 1968 and 1975
would be at the rate of 10.4 per cent per annum,
significantly less than the OECD average of 14.1 per
cent. The acceptance of the target by all concerned
is therefore distinctly in the UK interest, particularly
if the achievement of the target is combined with
some degree of untying of aid, whether by
agreement or multilateralisation.
Previously in this note we have mentioned the idea
of burden-sharing as accounting for the surprising
‘potency of life’ of the 1 per cent target. It is
reasonable to assume that the willingness of any
donor country to give aid, or to increase or untie its
aid, is increased by the willingness of other donor
countries to do the same in some recognised and
agreed degree, resulting in an agreed distribution of
the burden. However rough the flat rate of 1 per
cent of GNP may be, it is clearly better than nothing
and will do for a start. Some equality in the
distribution of total burden of aid would also lay the
foundation for some kind of agreed untying, because
this demonstrably would increase the value of the aid
to the recipients without hurting the donors
collectively, nor necessarily hurting any individual
donor separately.5
However, if the 1 per cent target is rightly put
forward as justified by the concept of ‘burden-
sharing’ obvious new complications arise. The ‘burden’
on the donor country will depend not only on the
‘value’ of the transfer – even if this could be clearly
and unambiguously determined – but also on the
particular circumstances of the donor country. A
donor country in full employment with inflationary
pressures and balance of payments troubles will
obviously feel the giving of any determined
proportion of GNP in the form of aid as a heavier
burden than a country with unemployed resources,
deflation, and balance of payments surpluses.
Moreover, the burden will be greatly affected by the
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form of aid. The best example is food aid. If the food is
genuinely surplus, arising from domestically oriented
agriculture policies, the burden may be zero or even
negative, particularly if it is remembered that food aid
if genuinely additional would serve to raise or
maintain world market prices. In that case, the real
‘burden’ of the food aid would not be carried by the
‘donors’ (e.g. the USA, Canada, Australia, etc.), but
rather by the commercial food importers (the UK,
Japan, etc. including also a number of
underdeveloped countries). Yet it is the food
exporters which are ‘credited’ with the food aid
against their 1 per cent target, not the food importers
who carry the real burden.
There are many other complications arising from
international aid targets which cannot be discussed
here. But perhaps enough has been said to show that
international targetry is complicated as well as potent.
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Notes
1 The eastern countries – outside the OECD –
although having equally voted for the target, have
never to the best of my knowledge attempted or
pretended to implement it, and I am not aware of
any corresponding discussions of the 1 per cent
target in COMECON or any other eastern
counterpart of the DAC/OECD.
2 I believe that John Pincus was the first to
calculate the grant element within the flows of
financial resources.  
3 For instance UK 1968 national income at market
prices £31,100m; GNP at market prices
£39,500m, a difference of 27 per cent on the
lower figure.
4 Partners in Development, Pall Mall Press (1969: 149).
5 Particularly if some kind of clearing arrangement
can be achieved in connection with an agreed
untying of aid.
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